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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the impact an emergency social assistance program, PANES, on 
school attendance and child labour. The program was carried out in Uruguay from April 2005 
to December 2007. Specifically, we analyze the effects of the cash transfer component of 
the plan (Ingreso Ciudadano), and explore potential explanatory channels such as labour 
market outcomes, income and awareness of conditionalities.  
This research is based on a panel of successful and unsuccessful applicants to PANES. The 
first wave uses the administrative records of the program and the second wave is a follow-up 
survey that was gathered two months after the program ended and was specifically designed 
to carry out the impact evaluation of the program. In order to check the robustness of our 
results, we provide evidence based on two different identification strategies: a regression 
discontinuity approach using data from the second wave of the panel, and a difference-in-
difference approach that exploits the longitudinal nature of the collected data. 
Our results indicate that the program did not affect school attendance or child labour, 
whether children are considered as one group or are disaggregated by age or sex. We also 
do not find any impact on household income, which suggests that income substitution does 
not explain the lack of results in terms of schooling. It therefore appears that either the size 
of the transfer was not generous enough to promote school attendance or that the 
determinants of child school attendance are more complex and require complementary 
interventions. Our results are particularly relevant for understanding of the role of cash 
transfers in middle-income countries where attendance rates at primary school are already 
high, and where the main challenge is to keep students in school at the secondary level. 
The data also allows us to explore the role of conditionalities. Only a small share of 
households was aware of the school enrolment condition (20%). Conditionalities were 
announced and are present in other social security programs in Uruguay, but were ultimately 
not monitored in this case. We did not find the conditionality to have any robust impact (as 
perceived by the household) on children’s school enrolment. 
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Introduction 
The provision of conditional cash transfers as a means to break the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty has involved a redesign of social protection systems in Latin 
America over the last two decades. One feature of these programs has been the emphasis 
on rigorous impact evaluations of their outcomes. The abundant literature on these impacts 
indicates that many programs have successfully increased child schooling and reduced child 
labour, with no major undesirable effects on adult labour supply (ECLAC, 2006; Fizbein and 
Schady, 2009). Yet, the design and implementation of these programs varies a great deal 
across various instances, while the baseline situation also differs across countries. In this 
context, this paper seeks to contribute to the accumulating evidence about the impacts of 
cash transfers by providing evidence about their effects in a middle-income country that has 
had universal access to primary schooling since early in the 20
th century and whose main 
challenges in education pertain to quality and secondary school enrolment. 
In what follows, we present an impact evaluation of Ingreso Ciudadano, the cash 
transfer component of a wider plan carried out in Uruguay from April 2005 to December 
2007 called the Plan Nacional de Atención a la Emergencia Social (PANES). Although the 
intervention had many long and short run objectives, we focus on its impact on child 
wellbeing and potential channels affecting this result. Specifically, we analyze the program’s 
effects on school attendance for children aged 3-17 and on child labour for those aged 6-17. 
We also explore the role of some of the potential channels highlighted in the cash transfer 
literature: Household income, adult labour supply and labour income, and conditionalities. 
This evaluation is based on two datasets: The official administrative records from 
PANES  applicants (the baseline data) and two rounds of a follow-up survey that was 
specifically designed to carry out the impact evaluation of the program, respectively gathered 
one-and-a-half years after the program started and two months after the program ended. 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we provide evidence using two 
identification strategies: A regression discontinuity (RD) approach using data from the 
second wave of the evaluation survey, and a difference-in-difference approach (also known 
as double-difference, or DD) that exploits the longitudinal nature of the collected data. The 
first wave of the follow-up survey allows us to explore the role of conditionalities. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature relating to cash 
transfers and the main outcomes of interest. Section 2 describes the program itself. Section 
3 presents the data and methodology used in this study. Section 4 contains background 
information about Uruguay, focusing on our main outcomes of interest. Our main results are 
presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 presents our main conclusions.     4
1. Cash transfers, child labour and school attendance 
1.1 The determinants of child labour and school attendance 
Traditionally, economic literature has considered school attendance and child labour 
as a joint decision in developing countries (Cardoso and Verner, 2007; Nielsen, 1998). In 
this framework that considers schooling and labour as alternative uses of time, human 
capital theory identifies two main reasons that children leave school to start work. One is that 
net returns are lower for human capital investments than for other assets, due to either high 
indirect and direct costs of schooling or low education quality. Another explanation focuses 
on capital market imperfections that may prevent investment in human capital.
2 
Child labour has usually been formalized in an overlapping generations framework 
(see Basu, 1999; Rosati and Rossi, 2003; Deb and Rosati, 2004; Basu and Pham, 1998). 
The basic form of these models is founded on the unitary household decision model that 
assumes child consumption to be solely determined by parental transfers.
3 Parental income 
depends in turn on their previous human capital accumulation, implying intergenerational 
transmission of child labour. In this setting, parents control the time of their children and they 
allocate it to either work or study. While work increases present consumption, school 
attendance yields increased future income. The parental decision for their children’s time 
allocation, given their level of available resources, is based on the relative cost of present 
and future consumption. Higher education costs and higher remuneration to child labour 
increase the relative cost of future consumption whereas the latter decreases as returns to 
human capital accumulation increase. 
Since the determinants of child labour and of school attendance are the same in 
these models, optimal behaviour leads to one of two corner solutions (a child either works or 
studies) or to a solution where the child both studies and works. However, if child labour and 
school attendance have different determinants, policies which promote the eradication of 
child labour may actually not promote school attendance and could thus even produce an 
increase in the number of idle children. Along these lines, Deb and Rosati (2004) develop a 
model that considers a third status in addition to these two options and allows for children to 
be idle. They argue that this third optimal solution can be observed if the value of a child’s 
leisure is positive or if work or schooling entail fixed costs. 
                                                 
2 For developed countries, the literature has identified other factors relating to school dropouts, such 
as drug use, alcohol consumption, and parents' psychiatric disorders, in all cases controlling for socio-
economic and personal characteristics (Cardoso and Verner, 2007).  
3 Bargaining models which depart from the unitary household decision model allow different 
outcomes for girls and boys, as household members can allocate resources according to their 
individual preferences.     5
The main results obtained in the empirical literature on child school attendance, child 
labour and idleness indicate the following: Older children and males are more likely to both 
attend school and work, older siblings are less likely to attend school, and children with lower 
ability are more likely to drop out of school to specialize in labour or otherwise become idle 
(Cardoso and Verner, 2007). In terms of household characteristics, typical findings indicate 
intergenerational persistence of child labour and a positive relationship between household 
economic wellbeing and school participation, as well as a negative one between household 
economic wellbeing and child labour. Finally, poverty is found to result in specialization in 
labour, or otherwise in inactivity, while negative shocks to the household increase the 
probability of dropping out of school and entrance onto the labour market. Cardoso and 
Verner (2007) also point out the presence of an unexplained negative correlation between 
school attendance and labour. 
In general terms, the empirical literature has also confirmed that income, wealth and 
credit availability are not strong explanatory factors (Deb and Rosati, 2004). Country specific 
studies show that a non-negligible share of children remains idle. These findings are 
important for three main reasons: i) Unobserved household characteristics could play a key 
role if they explain unobserved heterogeneity in access to credit and income; ii) it may be 
possible to reduce child labour without relying exclusively on income growth; iii) the 
phenomenon of children who neither work nor attend school (idle children) needs to be 
tackled to a greater extent in both theoretical and empirical works.
4 
In this context, we aim to analyze the potential impact of a cash transfer on child 
school attendance and child labour decisions, as this intervention may change determinants 
of these decisions. 
1.2 The impact of cash transfer programs on child labour and school attendance 
On the basis of the arguments presented in the previous section, household income 
can be pinpointed as a factor that explains how a cash transfer program may affect school 
attendance and child labour. If the transferred amount is above a certain threshold, the 
household modifies the child’s time allocation in favour of schooling (a formal model is 
presented in Skoufias and Parker, 2001). Hence, the incentive for sending children to school 
will vary with initial household income.
5  For the cash transfer to affect child labour and 
school attendance, an increase in net household income is required. This means that adults 
                                                 
4 If some training occurs on the job, idle children could become worse off in terms of human capital 
accumulation. Similarly, if labour market participation or school attendance involves access to 
networks, the state of being idle may lower social capital during the life cycle. 
5 For instance, if many eligible households were already sending their children to school, the incentive 
will lead children to allocate more time to studying rather than to increased enrollment rates.     6
should not compensate for the additional income from the transfer with a reduction in their 
labour effort. Given this potential disincentive effect, we also analyze potential channels 
which may result in a net negative income effect via labour market outcomes. 
Economic theory suggests that the income effect associated with the transfers may 
alter beneficiaries’ labour supply (see, for example, Moffit (2002) and Tabor (2002)). 
Specifically, they could lead to a fall in labour participation or the number of hours worked if 
we make the reasonable assumption that leisure is normal. Additionally, when programs are 
means tested (as was the case for the Uruguayan PANES, as described below), this creates 
an additional incentive to reduce labour supply, as means testing is in practice equivalent to 
an implicit tax on labour earnings. This would create an additional substitution effect, 
reducing labour supply. These adverse effects have led to important changes in the design 
of some welfare programs in USA, with evaluations suggesting the existence of important 
disincentive effects (Moffit, 2002). 
In the specific case of conditional cash transfers, these conditions may also influence 
outcomes. As Fiszbein and Schady (2009) argue, conditionalities are based on the idea that 
households’ misguided beliefs about the process of investment in human capital may affect 
decisions relating to their children’s education, or that parents may also discount the future 
more heavily than they should (“incomplete altruism”). Such factors would result in a lower 
level of human capital investment in children, and conditionalities are seen as a way to 
address these inefficiencies.
6  Skoufias and Parker (2001) therefore point out that school 
attendance conditions reduce the shadow price of schooling, which may reinforce the 
potential income effect of the transfer, so long as school and work are substitutes. However, 
since this is not necessarily the case, schooling can be promoted at the expense of child 
leisure. 
Theoretically, conditionalities may also affect adult labour supply because the time 
devoted to fulfilling conditionalities means that adults have less time for work. If these 
conditionalities include activities aimed at enhancing the human and social capital of adults 
in the household, the opposite effect could emerge in the medium run if program 
participation were to increase employability.
7 
                                                 
6 The other well known argument for conditionalities refers to the political economy of redistribution 
programs, as citizens tend to support conditional programs. Nevertheless, the arguments for and 
against the imposition of conditions are a debated issue. Some authors consider conditionalities as 
costly, inequitable, inefficient and offensive to basic egalitarian principles (Standing, 2008), whereas 
others highlight their benefits (de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2008). 
7 It should be noted that, since the impact of cash transfers on children’s outcomes depends on intra-
household resource decisions, specifying the transfer recipient affects the policy’s impact because it 
strengthens his/her internal bargaining power. There is evidence that cash transfers targeted at 
women have a stronger impact on children’s outcomes, particularly for girls (see Barrientos and     7
Impact evaluations have shown that conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs 
succeed at increasing child school attendance, particularly at the primary school level (see 
for example, ECLAC, 2006; Coady, 2001; Coady and Parker, 2002; Skoufias and Parker, 
2001; Attanasio et al., 2002; Schultz, 2004), although compliance with conditionalities was 
difficult and expensive to control. These effects were larger in countries with a lower initial 
enrolment rate. They were also concentrated in specific groups such as ethnic minorities, 
girls and children living in rural areas. Evidence regarding the effects on how far children 
ultimately go in school is thinner, and mostly comes from the experiences of a single 
program (Oportunidades in Mexico). It appears as though CCTs modestly impacted the 
number of years of schooling completed by adults, but they do not seem to have affected 
children’s school performance (ECLAC, 2006; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).  
In relation to child labour, the review provided by Fiszbein and Schady (2009) 
indicates that CCTs have been successful in reducing child labour, and that the favourable 
results are higher among older children. However, other studies show that child labour was 
reduced, albeit not to the extent originally expected by policy designers. This led to the 
hypothesis that schooling was, in part, increased by reducing child leisure time but not child 
labour. Ravallion and Wodon (2000) show that a conditional in-kind transfer in Bangladesh 
increased school attendance and did not reduce child labour, so it presumably reduced 
children’s leisure time. Skoufias and Parker (2001) found that PROGRESA in Mexico 
significantly increased school attendance and simultaneously reduced child labour, but in the 
case of girls, the increase in school attendance was much larger than the reduction in 
labour. This may indicate that the increase in schooling came at the expense of leisure time. 
In fact, using data from a time use module, they found that PROGRESA had no significant 
impact on the leisure time of boys but had a significant and negative impact for girls. 
There is important evidence on possible channels affecting school attendance and 
child labour. First, as previously pointed out, adults may compensate for the income transfer 
with reduced labour participation. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) argue that most CCT 
evaluations found no significant disincentive effect on adult work. The exception is the Red 
de Protección Social program in Nicaragua, for which a significant negative impact on hours 
worked by adult men was found.
8 
Secondly, many studies suggest that conditionalities may have explained some of the 
positive results found for school attendance. Evidence from several countries (Mexico, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Dejong, 2006). This may indicate a stronger preference of mothers for their children’s consumption or 
investment. 
8 The disincentive effect on hours worked was determined in relation to the control group because the 
labour supply of beneficiaries actually increased during the evaluation period (Maluccio and Flores, 
2005).     8
Ecuador, Cambodia and Brazil) suggests that the impact on school attendance would have 
been smaller if the CCTs had not included explicit conditions (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; 
Skoufias and Parker, 2001). De Brauw and Hoddinott (2008) test their importance in relation 
to the increase in school enrolment found for PROGRESA in Mexico. They exploit the fact 
that some program beneficiaries did not receive the form used for monitoring conditionalities, 
due to an administrative error. They find that children from households which did not receive 
the form were less likely to attend school, especially if their children were transitioning from 
primary to lower secondary school. Similarly, Schady and Araujo (2008) compare the impact 
of  Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), Ecuador’s conditional cash transfer program, on 
school enrolment among conditioned and unconditioned households. They find that the 
program’s effects on enrolment are only significant for conditioned households, defined as 
those who declared in the follow-up survey that they were aware of the enrolment 
requirement. 
2. The intervention: PANES 
2.1 Characteristics of the program 
In March 2005, a centre-left party (Frente Amplio) took power for the first time in 
Uruguay. The government created a new Ministry for Social Development (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Social, MIDES) and designed and implemented the Plan de Atención Nacional a 
la Emergencia Social (PANES), one of the pillars of its electoral campaign. PANES was a 
temporary anti-poverty program that lasted from April 2005 to December 2007. The program 
had two main aims: First, to provide direct assistance to households that had experienced a 
rapid deterioration in living standards since the 2001-2002 crisis; and second, in light of 
rising poverty during the 1980s and 1990s, to strengthen the human and social capital of the 
poor, to enable them to eventually climb out of poverty on their own. Although the program 
was in principle conditional on children’s school attendance and health check-ups, 
conditionalities were not enforced, as was publicly acknowledged by MIDES authorities after 
the program ended. 
The target population consisted of households belonging to the bottom quintile of the 
households below the national poverty line (approximately 8% of the population). 
Participating households had children in 95% of cases. In all, 102,353 households eventually 
became program beneficiaries, approximately 10% of Uruguayan households (and 14% of     9
the population). Targeting was very successful compared to most Latin American cash 
transfer programs (World Bank, 2007).
9 
PANES included several components. The largest was a monthly cash transfer 
(Ingreso  ciudadano, “Citizen income”), whose value per household was set at US$56 
(UY$1,360 at the 2005 exchange rate) regardless of household size. This transfer amounted 
to approximately 50% of the average self-reported pre-program household income. 
Households with children or pregnant women were also entitled to a food card (Tarjeta 
alimentaria), an in-kind transfer that operated through an electronic debit card whose 
monthly value varied between US$13 and US$30. Seventy percent of PANES beneficiary 
households received the food card. Other smaller components included a workfare program, 
job training, adult educational interventions and health care subsidies. 
As originally planned, the program was discontinued in December 2007 and replaced 
with a new system of family allowances that covered all PANES beneficiary households and 
most non-beneficiary (applicant) households, as it was also means tested and with a higher 
threshold.
10 
Due to administrative constraints, households experienced significant variations in 
the duration of time between application and receipt of their first payment. This problem was 
particularly acute in 2005. Given that applications were received throughout the program, 
exposure to this effect was heterogeneous between households. Nevertheless, the dataset 
used in the present evaluation does not have this problem, as will be detailed later in this 
paper. 
2.2 Enrolment and eligibility 
Enrolment occurred in two phases. All low-income households were publicly invited 
to apply. The application form recorded the name, sex, age, nationality and ID number of all 
household members and self-reported per capita income. The government also made a 
large outreach effort, sending enumerators to poor communities in an attempt to boost 
applications and to ensure program uptake among the most deprived households. Accepted 
applicants received benefits for the duration of the program and rejected households could 
reapply. 
                                                 
9 The total cost of the program – entirely financed by internal resources – was US$247,657,026, i.e., 
US$2,428 per beneficiary household. On an annual basis, this represents 0.41% of GDP and 1.95% 
of government social expenditures. 
10 The family allowance is named Asignaciones Familiares and is part of a wider program, called Plan 
de Equidad.     10
The program was means tested and only households with per capita income below 
approximately US$50 per month
11 were eligible and were subsequently visited by MIDES 
personnel. The income condition disqualified around 10% of the initial applicants. 
Eventually, 188,671 applicant households were visited by MIDES personnel and 
were administered a detailed baseline survey. This questionnaire resembles a typical 
household survey, with information collected on individual demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics (age, sex, access to health insurance, education and schooling, labour 
market participation, income) along with data on possession of durables and housing 
conditions. 
Among visited households, assignment to PANES was determined using a predicted 
poverty score that depended on household socioeconomic characteristics collected in the 
baseline survey.
12 Since a higher score denotes higher predicted poverty, only households 
with above a predetermined poverty score were assigned to the program.
13 The decision to 
use a composite score instead of a pure income test was driven by a number of factors. 
First, many households in the objective population had highly unstable income flows, so 
current income was not seen as a good proxy for permanent income. Second, since the 
target population was often employed in the informal sector, it was difficult to verify their 
reported income against social security records, introducing the possibility of misreporting. A 
wide array of socioeconomic characteristics, as opposed to self-reported income, was thus 
used by the government in the hope of minimizing strategic misreporting. 
Similar to other Latin American CCT programs, participation in PANES was, in 
principle, conditional on children's school attendance and health check-ups. Children aged 
6-14 years old were expected to be enrolled in and regularly attend school; pregnant women 
had to attend monthly prenatal visits (weekly starting at week thirty-six of the pregnancy) and 
have three mandatory ultrasound tests. Children aged 0-5 were supposed to comply with the 
mandatory paediatric check-ups and vaccinations prescribed by the Ministry of Health. Due 
to limited coordination between institutions, conditionalities were not actually enforced, an 
issue that was publicly acknowledged by MIDES after the end of the program. Nevertheless, 
this fact was not known by beneficiaries while the program was taking place, and even 
though they were informed about the conditions, they may reasonably have assumed they 
were being monitored by the authorities. 
                                                 
11 Per capita income was computed as the maximum between social security income (excluding non-
contributory benefits, i.e. child allowances and non-contributory pensions) and self-declared income. 
12 The score is based on a probit model of the likelihood of being below a critical level of per capita 
income relative to the poverty line (details can be found in Amarante et al., 2005). 
13 Eligibility thresholds were allowed to vary across the country’s five main administrative regions. The 
regional thresholds were set such that a similar share of poor households was entitled to the program 
in each area.     11
Information gathered in the first follow-up survey indicates that beneficiaries were not 
fully aware of the existence of conditionalities. In effect, 58% of beneficiary households were 
aware that some conditions were attached to the program and only 20% declared that 
compliance with child school attendance was required. This fact casts some doubts about 
the nature of the program. Although it is usually considered as a conditional cash transfer 
program, conditions were not monitored and, more importantly, data suggests that a 
considerable share of beneficiaries were unaware of them, particularly with respect to school 
attendance. In our analysis, we test for effects that depend on whether households were 
aware of the conditionalities. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
This research is based on official PANES records (the baseline data) and the second 
wave of a follow-up survey that was specially designed for the impact evaluation of the 
program. 
The official records and the follow-up surveys contain information on individual 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (age, sex, access to health insurance, 
education and schooling, labour market participation, income), on household possession of 
durable goods and on housing conditions. 
The impact evaluation involved collection of data through a special panel survey of a 
sample of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The main strategy to evaluate the program 
was a regression discontinuity analysis that used the program admission criteria due to the 
lack of information relating to many outcomes of interest in the baseline data. 
The sample was restricted to a group of households whose applications for benefits 
were evaluated between 23 September 2005 and 30 April 2006. Limiting our sample in this 
way considerably diminishes the potential heterogeneity problem mentioned above. Using 
data from this sample also ensures that the poverty score used for PANES eligibility is the 
same as that used for all applicants in our analysis. 
The first wave of the follow-up survey was carried out between October 2006 and 
March 2007, roughly eighteen months after the beginning of the program. To exploit the 
potential of the discontinuity design, the original survey sample contained data on 3,000 
households, including both eligible and ineligible applicants with scores near the program 
eligibility threshold. There was an interest in over-representing eligible households so that     12
the sample could be split between eligible and ineligible households in a 2:1 ratio.
14 The 
initial non-response rate was moderate, at 30%, so replacement households with 
approximately the same score as the non-responding households were subsequently 
interviewed. This first wave of the follow-up survey is only used in this analysis to explore the 
role of conditionalities. A second follow-up household survey was administered between 
March and June 2008, shortly after the temporary PANES program had already ended. 
Attrition is a minor concern, with 92% of households from the first follow-up round having 
been successfully re-surveyed. To limit strategic responses, surveyed households were not 
informed about the exact purpose of the follow-up surveys. This survey and the 
administrative records are the main datasets used in this study. The names of the survey 
and information provided to respondents referred solely to the university department in 
charge of field work and did not specifically mention PANES or the Ministry.
15 
3.2 Methodology 
In this section we present the two identification strategies used for the impact evaluation of 
PANES. First, we use a discontinuity regression approach, as the follow-up survey was 
specifically designed for this method. We also use a difference-in-difference approach to 
exploit the longitudinal nature of our data. 
a) Discontinuity regression 
As described earlier in this paper, assignment to PANES among applicant 
households was done on the basis of a predicted poverty score that depended only on 
household socioeconomic characteristics collected in a baseline survey and an income 
threshold that was compared to social security records. Households that were eligible on the 
basis of income were visited and only those with a predicted poverty score above a 
predetermined threshold were assigned to the program. 
Evidence from previous work on PANES (Manacorda et al., 2009) shows almost 
perfect compliance with the intended assignment rule. Graph 1 reports the proportion of 
households having ever enrolled in PANES as a function of the standardized score (based 
on official PANES data), making it clear that implementation of PANES was remarkably well-
targeted. Using the McCrary (2008) methodology, Amarante et al. (2011) show that the 
score is smoothly distributed in the vicinity of the discontinuity threshold, which suggests a 
general absence of manipulation. 
                                                 
14 This main sample was supplemented with data on 500 eligible households that were further from 
the eligibility threshold, although we do not use this data in the present paper. 
15  In addition to information on housing, household composition, possession of durables, labour, 
income and schooling (as in the baseline survey), the follow-up survey collected information on 
health, economic expectations, knowledge of political, labour and civil rights, trust in a wide set of 
institutions, participation in social groups, people or institutions he/she asks for help when in trouble, 
opinions about the PANES program, and political attitudes, including support for the government.     13
This design provides a credible quasi-experimental variation in assignment to the 
program that lends itself naturally to a sharp regression discontinuity approach. 
 
Graph 1. PANES eligibility and participation 
 
Source: Based on official PANES administrative records 
To operationalize the regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach, let Si be the 
predicted poverty score assigned to household i (where a higher score denotes higher 
predicted poverty) and let E denote the eligibility threshold, such that in principle only 
households with scores above E are eligible for treatment. Let Ni=Si-E be the normalized 
poverty score. Following Lee and Card (2008), we propose to regress the variable of interest 
for household i, yi, on a constant, an indicator for households above the threshold 1(Ni>0), 
and two parametric polynomials for the normalized score (f(Ni) and g(Ni)). This is done on 
each side of the threshold, such that f(0)=g(0)=0: 
(1)  yi=￿0 + ￿1 1(Ni>0) + f(Ni) + 1(Ni>0) g(Ni) + X’￿ + ui 
where X represents additional covariates. The identification assumption for RDD requires 
outcome variables to be a monotonic function of the predicted poverty score with the 
exception that the treatment has an additional effect (see for example Imbens and Lemieux, 
2008). Panel A.1 depicts the RDD analysis for the pre-treatment outcomes of interest. We 
used baseline data for the households included in the follow-up survey. These graphs clearly 
show that no discontinuity was present before treatment, which means that the RDD 
assumptions hold. 
In a case where the RDD assumptions hold, the potential discontinuity in the 
outcome variables in the vicinity of the discontinuity point can thus be legitimately interpreted 
as a program effect. The impact of the program will be then captured by ￿1, the change in y 
at the eligibility threshold. 
One drawback of RDD is that its determination of local average treatment effects in 
the vicinity of the discontinuity point cannot necessarily be generalized across program 
beneficiaries as a whole in cases where heterogeneous effects are present. 
b) Difference-in-differences     14
For all the outcomes included in this study, we have data for treatment and control 
groups before the program was implemented as well as on the two occasions that constitute 
the follow-up survey. The first round of the follow-up survey was collected eighteen months 
after the start of the program, while it was still running, while the second round was collected 
three months after the program ended. The results presented in this report pertain to the 
timeframe between the program registration and the second follow-up survey. 
The availability of panel data allows us to use a difference-in-difference estimation, 
also known as the double-difference method. This method essentially compares changes in 
the situation of both treatment and control groups relative to their observed outcome at a 
pre-intervention baseline. The method assumes that unobserved heterogeneity does not 
vary over time, so any potential biases from unobserved heterogeneity cancel each other out 
when looking at the difference in the change between groups. This is known as the parallel 
trend assumption, which means that unobserved characteristics that affect program 
participation do not vary over time with treatment status. 
Considering two periods, t=0 before the program and t=1 after the program begins, 
and outcomes 
T
t Y  and 
C
t Y   for the treatment and control groups, the double-difference 
method (DD) estimates the average program impact as: 
(2)   ) 0 ( ) 1 ( 1 0 1 1 0 1 = − − = − = T Y Y E T Y Y E DD
C C T T  
where  1 1 = T  indicates that the program was active at time t=1 and  0 1 = T denotes lack of 
treatment at time t=1. In this formulation, the effect of the program is calculated as the 
difference between the differences in the observed outcomes for the treatment and control 
groups before and after the intervention. The DD estimate can also be calculated using a 
regression framework. In this case the equation can be specified as: 
(3)   it i i it t T t T Y ε γ ρ β α + + + + = 1 1  
where  1 1 = T  indicates that the program was active at time t=1 and  0 1 = T  denotes lack of 
treatment at time t=1. The coefficient β , corresponding to the interaction between the 
treatment variable and the time variable, gives the average DD effect of the program. For the 
DD estimator to be interpreted correctly, the error term must be uncorrelated with the other 
variables in the equation, and specifically it must hold that: 
(4)   0 ) , ( 1 = t T Cov i it ε  
The regression version of the DD estimator can include covariates (X), but two 
factors must be taken into account. Although the only helpful strategy would be to include     15
time varying Xs, these may be affected by the treatment, introducing endogeneity. These 
aspects must be taken into account when introducing the covariates, as seen in (5): 
(5)  it i i i it X t T t T Y ε φ γ ρ β α + + + + + = 1 1  
Finally, we combine the two methodologies by using the regression discontinuity 
polynomials interacted with time as a set of control variables in the difference-in-differences 
regression: 
(6)  it i i i it X t ) g(Ni)t (Ni   f(Ni)t  T t T Y ε φ γ ρ β α + + + > + + + + = 0 1   1 1  
4. Poverty, inequality, school attendance and child labour in Uruguay 
Uruguay is a small, middle-income Latin American country. Its’ poverty and inequality 
indices are among the lowest in the region and the PPP-adjusted annual per capita income 
is currently just below US$10,000. Nevertheless, an increasing trend in the incidence of 
indigence and poverty between 1994 and 2005 has been documented in many studies 
(Amarante et al., 2004 and UNDP, 2008, among others), as has the trend of increasing 
income inequality (UNDP, 2008; Alves et al., 2011). These trends are shown in Graph 2a 
and graph Graph 2b. The underlying causes of this erosion of household wellbeing mostly 
have to do with changing labour market performance, the severe 2002 economic crisis, the 
small amount of public transfers to poor households and the fact that the social security 
system was largely focused on transfers to the elderly. At the beginning of PANES in 2005, 
the poverty incidence reached 29% of the total population and was 49.4% for children aged 
0-17 (Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). 
 
Graph 2a. Poverty and indigence. 
Uruguay. 1990-2009 








































































































































































































Source: Based on household surveys. 
 
 
The Uruguayan educational system is organized into three main levels: Three years 
of pre-primary school starting at the age of 3, six years of primary education, and six years of     16
secondary education. In 2005, attendance was compulsory for children from the age of 5 
until completion of the third year of secondary school.
16 Attendance rates for 4- and 5-year-
old children have increased significantly over the last decade as a result of the education 
system reform carried out in the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, primary school attendance has been 
almost universal since the early decades of the 20
th century and has long held steady 
(Graph 3). The main problems at the primary level are repetition and absenteeism (UNDP, 
2008). 



















3 to 5 6 to 13 14 to 17
 
Source: Based on household surveys 
The main failure of the Uruguayan educational system is located at the secondary 
level, where dropout rates have held steady since the 1980s. As a result, the average years 
of schooling among adults has grown slowly in recent decades (reaching 8.6 years in 2008), 
but Uruguay’s early achievements in this respect have been surpassed by other Latin 
American countries (UNDP, 2008). Dropouts are mainly concentrated in the lower income 
strata, and boys both number heavily among this group and have a higher labour market 
participation rate (Bucheli and Casacuberta, 2000; UNDP, 2008).
17 The reasons for these 
high school dropout rates have not been clearly established in the existing literature, which 
shows high correlation between dropping out of school, and income shortages and poor 
socioeconomic conditions. 
The quality of education provided at secondary school is also an issue of present 
concern. Although Uruguay performed regionally well on the standard PISA assessment, a 
significant proportion of teenagers do not meet minimum competency requirements. 
                                                 
16 Since January 2009, a new education law has set schooling as compulsory from the age of 4 until 
completion of the sixth year of secondary school. 
17 During the crisis, the secondary school attendance rate grew.     17
Regarding child labour, Uruguay has ratified international agreements (No. 138 and 
182 from the ILO). The minimum legal age to work is 15, and children aged 15-18 must have 
special approval from the authorities to work. Working conditions are the main criteria 
considered to get this permission. 
Information on child labour in Uruguay is scarce for children under the age of 14.  
Household surveys only gather information on the work status of children aged 14-17 (Table 
1). This information shows that the share of idle children (not working or attending school) is 
surprisingly high, and reaches 24% among poor households and 34% among indigent ones. 
The percentage of children who are only working at this age is relatively low. Some of these 
apparently idle children may in fact be engaged in domestic chores. 














Indigent households  52% 5% 9% 34%  100% 
Poor households  62% 5% 9% 24%  100% 
All households   75% 3% 6% 16%  100% 
Source: Based on household survey 
For children younger than 14, a special module attached to the 2006 household 
survey aimed to identify child labour among children aged 5-17. The results indicate that 
only 1.5% of children aged 5-11 work, whereas the percentage climbs to 9.2 for those 
between 12 and 17 (Table 2). 
Table 2. Incidence of child labour in Uruguay – 2006 (percentage) 
  5-11  12-17  5-17 
Montevideo  1.9  7.1 4.5
Rest of the country  1.4  9.5 5.4
Total  1.5  9.2 5.4
Source: Arim and Salas (2007) 
Our data shows that school enrolment was initially lower among PANES beneficiaries 
than among unsuccessful applicants. However, school attendance rates among beneficiaries 
in the second follow-up survey (two years later) even surpass non-beneficiaries for children 
aged 3-5. The large increase in school attendance at these ages is explained by the fact that 
schooling was declared as compulsory starting at the age of 4 during this period. The 
opposite trend exists among children aged 14-17. Baseline information about child labour 
was not gathered for children under 14. For the group aged 14-17, child labour is seen to 
increase when comparing the datasets that represent the two points in time. Although the     18
labour market participation rate among PANES beneficiaries was higher and their labour 
income was lower at the baseline, this was not still the case at the time of the follow-up 
survey. Personal labour income appears to more than double in real terms when comparing 
the pre-program administrative record and the follow-up survey, and per capita household 
income increases by 75% in real terms (Table 3). These results regarding income are 
probably affected by strategic initial responses about income from applicants. 

















 3-5  6-13  14-17  6-17  14-17       
Baseline                
Beneficiaries 43  98  78  n.a  11  64  1240  742 
Non-
beneficiaries 
55 99  79 n.a 15  62  1320  603 
All 47  98  79  n.a  12  63  1267  648 
2
nd follow up survey 
Beneficiaries 85  99  75  7  17  63  2688  1211 
Non-
beneficiaries 
84 99  75  8  19  62  2637  1093 
All 85  99  75  8  18  63  2655  1131 
*Income in Uruguayan pesos, constant prices (April 2007=100) 
Source: Based on PANES administrative record and 2
nd follow-up survey.
5. Main results 
In what follows we explore the effect of PANES on school attendance and child 
labour. After that, we focus on two explanatory channels: Adult labour supply and household 
income. We also analyze whether awareness of the conditionalities played a role in fostering 
school attendance. 
5.1 Child outcomes: School attendance and child labour 
As previously stated, we use RDD and DD analysis to evaluate whether the program 
affected school attendance. Our dependent variable in the RDD is the child’s school 
attendance, and we consider three alternative specifications. The first includes the treatment 
variable and is a linear function of the normalized score, the second includes a quadratic 
polynomial, and the third augments the second specification with a set of covariates: Sex     19
and age of the child, region of residence, housing characteristics (flooring and ceiling 
materials) and household head attributes (sex, age and education). These three 
specifications are respectively the first through third column of table 4. In the DD 
specifications, we report results for individual fixed effects and with a polynomial on the 
poverty score interacted with time as a group of control variables (the fourth and fifth 
columns in table 4). Covariates that vary with time are excluded to avoid endogeneity.
18 
Table 4. Effects on school attendance by age group. Marginal effects coefficient and 
standard deviation of the treatment variable. 















DD with RD 
polynomial  
(5) 
3-5 years old 
Total 0.00526 0.0212  0.0293  0.107  0.0817 
  (0.0616) (0.1028) (0.0853)  (0.0487)** (0.102) 
6-17 years old  
Total  0.038 0.005 0.007  0.0309  0.0133 
  (0.0292) (0.0404) (0.0123) (0.0172)* (0.0386) 
Boys 0.0108 -0.0411  -0.00125  0.0570 0.0268 
  (0.0363) (0.0504) (0.0162)  (0.0255)**  (0.0566) 
Girls 0.0656  0.041  0.0125  0.00625  0.000512 
  (0.0418) (0.0529) (0.0159) (0.0231) (0.0526) 
6-13 years old 
Total -0.0121  -0.00335  -0.00731 0.0120 0.00154 
  (0.0364) (0.0350) (0.0182) (0.0139) (0.0295) 
14-17 years old 
Total 0.115 -0.0145  -0.00414  0.0585 0.0175 
    (0.0883) (0.0802) (0.0696) (0.0440)  (0.110) 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Based on PANES administrative record and 2
nd follow-up survey 
Our RDD estimates indicate that the program had no impact on school attendance. 
We report the coefficient of the treatment variables (marginal effects) in table 4.
21 The lack of 
                                                 
18 The number of observations for all estimations included in this section is presented in tables A.5 to 
A.7. 
21 An annex containing all graphs with RDD results is available upon request.     20
impact on school attendance is robust to different specifications and persists when children 
are disaggregated by age or sex.
22 
For the difference-in-difference strategy, we find a weakly significant positive effect in 
the fixed effects estimation for children aged 3-5. It must be stressed that the two 
identification strategies choose different sets of children: For example, whereas RDD selects 
children that were 3-5 years old at the time of the follow-up survey, the difference-in-
difference approach selects children that were 3-5 years old at the baseline, so they were 
approximately 5-7 years old when the survey was gathered. This implies that, rather than 
indicating a program effect, the coefficient for this age group reflects the fact that children 
were six years old and entered compulsory primary school. Attendance rates at this age 
were considerably lower for PANES beneficiaries at the baseline, driving this significant 
result as children enter primary school (see table 3). 
Although the RDD strategy does not show any impact for children aged 6-17, a weak 
effect, driven by boys, appears again for the fixed effects DD estimation. This weak effect 
disappears when disaggregating by age group, and is also not present in the polynomial 
specification of the DD approach. The general picture thus indicates that no robust effect on 
schooling is found. 
We also estimated PANES’ impact on child labour for those aged 6-17. In this case, 
the dependent variable is the child’s labour status, and three RDD specifications were 
considered again, using the same control variables as for school attendance. No significant 
effect is found in any of these three specifications (Table ) or in the graphical analysis. 
                                                 
22 We tried single age disaggregations and different age groupings but the results were no diferent. 
We have also analyzed impacts by household size. Detailed results are available upon request.     21
Table 5 Effects on child labour. Marginal effects coefficient and standard deviation of 
the treatment variable. RDD estimation. 





6-17 years old    
Total 
-0.0240 0.0177 0.0136 
(0.0277) (0.0442) (0.0291) 
Boys 
-0.0369 0.0165 0.00322 
(0.0418) (0.0647) (0.0455) 
Girls 
-0.0139 0.0130 0.0115 
(0.0279) (0.0458) (0.0308) 
6-13 years old       
Total 
-0.0164 0.00329 0.00493 
(0.0206) (0.0395) (0.0228) 
Boys 
-0.0271 -0.0605 -0.0648 
(0.0347) (0.1304) (0.1209) 
Girls 
-0.00358 0.0296  0.0376 
(0.0208) (0.0338) (0.0405) 
14-17 years old       
Total 
-0.0109 0.0444 0.0316 
(0.0513) (0.0840) (0.0775) 
Boys 
-0.0229 0.0467 0.0563 
(0.0810) (0.1267) (0.1231) 
Girls 
-0.0132 0.0285 0.00458 
(0.0536) (0.0847) (0.0834) 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Based on 2
nd follow-up survey 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, information on child labour for children younger 
than 14 was not gathered at the baseline, so the difference-in-difference strategy can only 
be used to explore this outcome for children aged 14-17. DD estimates yield the same 
results as RDD for this group: The program did not affect child labour for those aged 14-17 
at the baseline (table 6). 
In terms of primary schooling, attendance rates were close to 100%, so it was very 
unlikely to expect program effects for children aged 6-13. For teenagers, the program had 
some space to increase school enrolment, but this result was not achieved. This lack of 
improvement can be linked to the paucity of incentives given the small size of the transfer 
relative to household income (recall that the transfer did not vary with household size), lack 
of monitoring of the conditionalities and potential substitution effects that may have inhibited     22
an increase in household income. In the following section, we investigate the last two 
potential channels. 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Based on PANES administrative record and 2
nd follow up-survey. 
5.2 Potential channels: Adult labour market participation and household income 
To carry out the analysis of the income channel, we analyzed impacts on labour 
market decisions of adults, considering the following outcome variables: Participation rates, 
unemployment, employment, hours of work and labour income. Again, we run three RDD 
specifications: The first is linear and uses the treatment variable and the normalized poverty 
score, the second combines the score with a quadratic term and the third one includes a set 
of individual control variables (age, sex and region of residence) and housing characteristics 
(flooring and ceiling materials). 
No significant effects were found for labour force participation, unemployment or the 
number of hours worked, and this holds whether considering all adults in beneficiary 
households or PANES holders alone (table 7). There is limited evidence of a positive effect 
on employment from the RDD estimation, implying that PANES participants are more likely 
to hold a job. This weak effect is found both for men and women, and corresponds to people 
living outside the capital, in the rest of the country (see table A.2 in the annex). This effect 
was not found in the first round of the evaluation survey and is also not apparent in the 
graphical analysis. 
Table 6. Effects on child labour. Children 14-17. Marginal effects coefficient and 
standard deviation of the treatment variable.  DD estimation 
  
Individual fixed effects 
(1)   
DD including RD polynomial 
(2) 
Total 0.0140  0.1440 
 (0.0426)  (0.1021) 
Boys 0.0008  0.2922 
 (0.0648)  (0.1591)* 
Girls -0.0364  0.04811 
   (0.0588)  (0.1432)     23
Table 7. Effects on labour market. Marginal effects coefficient and standard deviation 
of the treatment variable. 
 RDD  DD 















All                
Labour market 
participation 
0.0488 0.0568 0.0488  0.0123  0.0120 
(0.0289)* (0.0449) (0.0289)*  (0.0160)  (0.0373) 
Unemployment 
0.00422 -0.0324 -0.0418  -0.00424  -0.00224 
(0.0157) (0.0271) (0.0312)  (0.0133)  (0.0230) 
Employment 
0.0446 0.0863  0.122  0.0165  0.00768 
(0.0267)* (0.0410)**  (0.0457)***  (0.0167)  (0.0362) 
Hours of work 
-1.631 -5.175 -3.686  -0.978  -2.660 
(1.888) (2.796)* (2.943)  (1.497)  (2.348) 
PANES holders or applicants 
Labour market 
participation 
0.0462 0.113 0.0963  -0.0040  0.0025 
(0.0413) (0.0664)* (0.0676)  (0.0215)  (0.0548) 
Unemployment 
-0.00993 -0.0574  -0.0617  -0.0120  -0.0153 
(0.0276) (0.0500) (0.0507)  (0.0191)  (0.0452) 
Employment 
0.0560 0.163  0.167  0.0079  -0.0048 
(3.885) (5.409) (5.461)  (0.0239)  (0.0599) 
Hours of work 
-2.939 -7.395 -7.172  -1.277  -1.209 
(2.794) (4.228)*  (4.270)*  (1.881)  (3.149) 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Based on PANES administrative record and 2
nd follow up survey. 
Our results indicate that the program had no effect on personal labour income 
(considering people older than 20): No significant difference is found between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries in the vicinity of the threshold (table 8). Thus, the positive effect on 
employment is not seen in terms of labour income. More importantly, no discontinuity was 
found when comparing total household income (in per capita terms) between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries. This result allows us to reject the presence of a substitution effect 
among beneficiary households, although in a related study that uses social security and 
program microdata, Amarante et al. (2010) show that PANES reduced formal employment 
and earnings, probably due to the income eligibility threshold. Hence, the previously reported 
lack of effect on schooling cannot be attributed to strategic behaviour, such as beneficiary     24
households having substituted some share of the transfer for their previous income once 
they began to receive the transfer.
23 
Table 8. Effects on personal labour income and total household income. Marginal 
effects coefficient and standard deviation of the treatment variable (people older than 
20). 
















-0.0778 -0.125 0.0162  -0.00717  -0.0860 




-0.0738 -0.00811 -0.0107  0.0649 0.190 
(0.0647) (0.0999) (0.0952) (0.0557) (0.107)* 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Based on PANES administrative record and 2
nd follow-up survey. 
The above analysis shows that households did not engage in strategic behaviour as 
a consequence of receiving the transfer. Total household income and labour income do not 
show any discontinuity or any difference in the change between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries. If no potential substitution effect took place, then the lack of impact on 
schooling must be explainable by other factors. 
5.3 The role of conditionalities 
One explanation of how cash transfer programs positively impact outcomes such as 
school attendance refers to conditions which may compel households to behave differently, 
particularly in relation to their demand for education and health services (Skoufias and 
Parker, 2001; De Brauw and Hoddinott, 2008; Schady and Araujo, 2008). The imposition of 
conditionalities is, however, by no means uncontroversial: Some authors argue that the 
conditions are inherently paternalistic and assume that parents either do not know what is in 
the best interests of their children or are irrational. It has also proven difficult to monitor 
conditionalities, while effective monitoring may even carry regressive effects, with more 
students dropping out among more vulnerable households. Conditionalities imply direct 
costs that are typically assumed by mothers (Molyneux, 2008). Evidence about the effects of 
                                                 
23 One potential weakness of this argument is that information on income was gathered 3-6 months 
after the end of the program. The data gathered during the first follow-up survey do not show any 
effect on labour income (Amarante et al., 2009). We nevertheless hold our argument, based on the 
assumption that it is not easy for households to significantly change their sources of income over such 
a short period of time.     25
imposing conditions on beneficiaries is still scarce, largely due to methodological challenges 
involved in isolating their effects. 
In the first follow-up survey, beneficiaries were asked to specify conditions (if any) 
that must be met to receive the transfer. This information allows us to test whether being 
“conditioned” has a different impact on children’s school attendance than not being 
“conditioned”, with analysis restricted to beneficiary households. 
Only 20% of respondents were aware of the school enrolment requirement for 
children aged 6-17. To start with, we estimated the effect of the respondents’ awareness of 
conditions on the probability of school attendance among children aged 6-17 by controlling 
for the selection score (column 1 in table 9), and then adding the same control variables 
used in the other regressions (column 2). 
Table 9. Effects of conditionality on school enrolment. Marginal effects 
coefficient and standard deviation of the treatment variable. 6-17 years. 
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6-17 0.0397  0.00897  0.0461  0.0178 
 (0.0140)***  (0.00706)  (0.0192)**  (0.0163) 
Men 0.0459  0.00103  0.0296  0.0208 
 (0.0200)**  (0.0105)  (0.0246)  (0.0220) 
Women 0.0380  0.0158 0.0349 0.0182 
 (0.0185)**  (0.00825)*  (0.0281)  (0.0245) 
6-13 0.00241  0.00127  0.0383  0.00739 
 (0.00520)  (0.00286)  (0.0165)**  (0.0107) 
14-17 0.0608  0.0518  0.0225  -0.00110 
 (0.0489)  (0.0524)  (0.0524)  (0.0523) 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Based on PANES administrative record and 2
nd follow-up survey. 
 
The positive correlation between children’s school attendance and respondents’ 
awareness of conditionalities disappears once control variables are included.
25 Our second 
strategy is to run difference-in-difference estimations, considering individual fixed effects 
(column 3) and also with control variables considered in addition to the individual fixed 
effects (column 4). The control variables in this last column include age and two dummies 
that indicate whether the child attends primary or secondary school. Again, the variable that 
                                                 
25 This positive correlation can also be seen in table A.4.     26
reflects awareness of conditionalities only has a small effect, both for children as a whole 
and for those aged 6-13, but this effect disappears once control variables are included. 
Our results thus do not indicate that awareness of conditionalities robustly affects school 
attendance. I.e., the positive association between both variables is explained by other 
observable variables, and once they are controlled for, the likelihood of attending school is 
not affected by households’ awareness (or lack thereof) of conditions. Nevertheless, our 
results’ ability to be informative for this policy debate are limited, due to the lack of any 
strategy to clearly identify whether households were aware of the fact that monitoring was 
not actually carried out. 
7. Final comments 
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of a cash transfer program on child labour and 
school attendance and three potential channels that have been established in the existing 
literature: Labour market outcomes, income and conditionalities. Our results indicate that the 
program did not affect school attendance or child labour, for children as a whole or when 
disaggregating by age group or sex. 
The results with respect to child school attendance are not surprising for primary 
schooled aged children, as attendance is almost universal at this level of schooling in 
Uruguay. For children in secondary school, our evidence suggests that either the transfer 
was too small of an incentive to promote secondary school attendance or that variables 
other than income are involved in this decision. Even though the lack of impact holds both 
for households that were considered as conditioned and unconditioned, the lack of impact 
may be also associated with the lack of monitoring of conditionalities The result concerning 
the effects on secondary school attendance is relevant for the design of future policies in 
Uruguay, as conditional cash transfer programs are envisioned as a tool to promote 
attendance at this level. 
This lack of effects is not related to substitution effects led by variations in labour 
market participation, personal labour income or household labour income. Our results 
suggest that transfer schemes in Uruguay should be redesigned to influence schooling and 
child labour decisions at the household level. For example, larger transfers, incentives for 
completion and payments that vary with household size could be considered. Another 
relevant insight suggested in the literature is that income is not the main variable affecting 
these decisions, particularly among teenagers, and that complementary interventions are 
needed in order to foster school attendance in this age group.     27
The specific features of this intervention and the fact that it was launched in a middle-
income country like Uruguay may provide useful insights into how the effects of cash transfer 
programs vary across contexts. It may also highlight that interventions differ from one 
country to the next and that it is risky to make generalizations in relation to successful 
policies. At present, however, the policy debate tends to emphasize general policy impacts 
on the basis of evidence from well known successful experiences 
     28
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Table A.1. Poverty incidence by age group. 1990-2008. 
Year  0-5  6-12  13-17 0-17 18-64 Over 65  Total 
1990  49.6  46.7  41.6 46.0 24.3 15.0  29.6 
1991  41.1  39.8  33.0 38.0 19.1 9.7 23.3 
1992  37.8  36.6  29.5 34.6 16.1 6.7 20.2 
1993  32.5  31.2  26.7 30.1 13.4 5.5 16.9 
1994  30.5  28.6  24.0 27.7 11.9 4.1 15.1 
1995  34.3  32.1  25.9 30.9 14.0 5.0 17.3 
1996  35.3  31.8  25.6 31.0 13.6 4.8 17.0 
1997  36.1  30.3  25.6 30.7 14.1 4.8 17.1 
1998  34.7  29.2  26.7 30.1 13.1 4.1 16.7 
1999  32.9  29.2  23.4 28.4 12.4 3.4 15.7 
2000  37.7  32.0  25.9 31.7 14.4 3.8 17.8 
2001  38.3  35.4  27.7 34.0 15.3 3.9 18.8 
2002  46.5  41.9  34.6 41.1 20.3 5.4 23.6 
2003  56.5  50.2  42.8 49.8 27.8 9.7 30.9 
2004  56.5  53.7  45.0 51.9 28.7 10.8  32.1 
2005  54.1  51.0  42.8 49.4 25.8 9.2 29.4 
2006  48.6  47.6  40.0 45.6 22.6 7.7 26.8 
2007  46.4  46.5  39.7 44.5 21.3 6.9 25.8 
2008  38.4  36.8  32.1 35.8 17.1 6.0 20.6     32
Table A.2. Effects on labour market. Marginal effects coefficient and standard 
deviation of the treatment variable.  

















Men                
Labour market 
participation 
0.0526 0.0681 0.0575 0.0427  0.0841 
(0.0395) (0.0608) (0.0638) (0.0289)  (0.0682) 
Unemployment 
0.0104 -0.00128  -0.00143  -0.00177  -0.0196 
(0.0238) (0.0421) (0.0400) (0.0155)  (0.0291) 
Employment 
0.0413 0.0672 0.0752 0.0444  0.104 
(0.0420) (0.0661) (0.0700) (0.0300)  (0.0698) 
Hours of work 
0.0782 2.262  1.536 -0.266  -0.391 
-1.457 -2.365 -2.092 -1.863  -3.913 
Women                
Labour market 
participation 
0.0395 0.0635 0.0801  0.00799  -0.0424 
(0.0363) (0.0568) (0.0580) (0.0244)  (0.0567) 
Unemployment 
-0.00518 -0.0625  -0.0690 0.00742  0.00217 
(0.0269) (0.0463) (0.0478) (0.0151)  (0.0352) 
Employment 
0.0449 0.118  0.153  0.000575  -0.0271 
(0.0360) (0.0554)**  (0.0559)***  (0.0238) (0.0545) 
Hours of work 
-0.00518 -0.0625  -0.0690  -0.894  -2.302 
(0.0269) (0.0463) (0.0478)  -1.974  -2.547 
Montevideo                 
Labour market 
participation 
0.158 0.114  0.0976  0.0321  0.219** 
(0.0667)** (0.0972)  (0.0995)  (0.0491) (0.103) 
Unemployment 
0.0494 0.0765 0.0849  -0.00394  0.0665 
(0.0370) (0.0464)* (0.0475)* (0.0261)  (0.0453) 
Employment 
0.105 0.0164  0.00117  0.0360  0.152 
(0.0574)* (0.0785)  (0.101)  (0.0477) (0.103) 
Hours of work 
1.847 -4.062 -2.789 4.197  4.371 
-3.885 -5.409 -5.461 -3.305  -5.957 
Rest of the country  
Labour market 
participation 
0.0322 0.0545 0.0636 0.0221  -0.0307 
(0.0326) (0.0525) (0.0519) (0.0201)  (0.0461) 
Unemployment 
-0.00408 -0.0603  -0.0802 0.00802  -0.0251 
(0.0173)  (0.0317)* (0.0370)** (0.0116) (0.0191) 
Employment 
0.0362 0.109  0.146 0.0141  -0.00558 
(0.0300) (0.0471)**  (0.0513)***  (0.0200) (0.0458) 
Hours of work 
-2.539 -6.275 -5.337 -1.534  -2.452 
-2.145 (3.336)* -3.488  -1.489 -2.996 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A.3. Effects on personal labour income. Marginal effects coefficient and 
standard deviation of the treatment variable (people older than 20).  By sex and 
region. 











DD with RD 
polynomial 
Total 
-0.0778 -0.125 0.0162  -0.00717  -0.0860 
(0.0823) (0.133)  (0.112) (0.0784) (0.203) 
Women 
-0.129 -0.110  -0.0219  -0.0561  -0.171 
(0.108) (0.178) (0.161) (0.175) (0.392) 
Men 
-2.03e-05 -0.0497  0.0607  0.0995  0.150 
(0.112) (0.182) (0.139) (0.213) (0.493) 
Montevideo  
-0.145 -0.372 -0.300 0.465 -0.222 
(0.206) (0.305) (0.246) (0.386) (0.301) 
Rest of the 
country 
-0.0675 -0.0415 0.0704 -0.0290  1402 
(0.0887) (0.147)  (0.127)  (0.143)  (0.943) 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Based on PANES administrative record and 2
nd follow up survey. 
 
Table A.4. School attendance rates and 
conditionalities 




6 96.3  93.0 
7 100.0  98.0 
8 99.0  97.7 
9 98.4  100.0 
10 98.4  100.0 
11 99.0  98.0 
12 100.0  100.0 
13 95.7  100.0 
14 91.1  94.3 
15 82.1  87.9 
16 73.4  75.0 
17 64.2  80.0 
Source: Based on 2
nd follow up survey.     34
 



















Table  4        
Age 3-5  622  622 614  1243 1243 
Age 6-17           
Total   2.537 2.537 2.519  5073 5073 
Boys  1.305 1.305 1.299  2609  2609 
Girls  1.232 1.232 1.220  2464  2464 
Age  6-13  1811 1811 1767  3621  3621 
Age 14-17  726  726  726  1452  1452 
Table 5         
Age 6-17           
Total  2.537 2.537 2.519  5073 5073 
Boys  1.305 1.305 1.299  2609  2609 
Girls  1.232 1.232 1.220  2464  2464 
Age 6-13           
Total  1811 1811 1767  3621  3621 
Boys 928  928  917  1855  1855 
Girls 883  883  850  1766  1766 
14-17         
Total   726  726  689  1452  1452 
Boys 377  377  368  754  754 
Girls 349  349  321  698  698 
Table 6         
14-17 726  726  689  1452  1452 
Boys 377  377  368  754  754 
Girls 349  349  321  698  698 
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DD with RD 
polynomial 
Table 7        
All        
Labour force 
participation 
9792 9792 9792  14774  14774 
Employment  9792 9792 9792  14774 14774 
Unemployment  9792 9792 9792  14774 14774 
Hours of work  9792 9792 9792  14774 14774 
PANES applicants         
Activity  2733 2733 2733  5466 5466
Employment  2733 2733 2733  5466 5466 
Unemployment  2733 2733 2733  5466 5466 
Hours of work  2733 2733 2733  5466 5466 
Table 8         
Personal labour 
income 16129  16129  16005  14774  14774 
Household  income 2791  2791  2733 5466 5466 
 
 
Table A.7. Number of observations. Table 9  
 2












6-17  2.018 1.963 3.777  3.621 
Boys  1.044 1.023 1.911  1.875 
Girls 967  938  1.734  1.680 
6-13  1.424 1.340 2.685  2.604 
14-17 594  581  1.092  1.017 
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Panel A.1. RD graphs of outcomes at the baseline 
 
a.  School attendance 3-5  b.  School attendance 6-13 c.  School attendance 14-17 d.  School attendance 6-17
 
e.  Labour force participation  f. Employment rate g.  Unemployment rate
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